Asymmetric Warfare Requires Critical Thinking

Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of the forthcomingbook Goodbye Globalization. She writes: “The Houthis’ attacks on merchant vessels have made the Red Sea unsafe for shipping. But the militia’s actions are only some of the many infractions of maritime rules worldwide. China harasses vessels and builds artificial islands, Iran targets shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and unknown actors sabotage sea-based infrastructure. The global maritime order, which underpins our prosperity, is in peril. Rule-abiding governments can save it.

“We . . . are determined to hold malign actors accountable for unlawful seizures and attacks,” 14 countries, led by the U.S., U.K., Germany, and Japan, warned the Houthis on Jan. 3. The Houthis made clear what they thought of this red line by continuing their attacks. Though vessels in the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian staved off Houthi boats and drones heading for merchant vessels, their presence remained well short of direct retaliation against the Houthis. The Houthis’ “aerial and seaborne drones have truly tipped the balance away from those with mighty fleets,” retired Rear Adm. David Manero, a former U.S. defense attaché to Russia, said. Freddy Furulund, an executive with Norwegian maritime insurer DNK, said, “These states and groupings target an area where we’re vulnerable. It’s a clever approach, but it’s still illegal.”

Soon after the warning, Houthi leader Mohammed Ali al-Houthi said any country involved in Prosperity Guardian in the Red Sea would see its vessels targeted. Unsurprisingly, shipping lines are diverting their vessels from the area. In late December, merchant traffic in the Red Sea was down by nearly one-fifth from the same period in 2022, according to Lloyd’s List Intelligence. On Jan. 11, the U.S. and the U.K., supported by four allies, decided that the Houthis’ violation of maritime rules couldn’t continue. They launched strikes against Houthi-held parts of Yemen. (The strike coalition of six is down from Prosperity Guardian’s more than 20, itself a low number.)

The Houthis, whom the U.S. is putting back on its terrorist list, aren’t the only ones flouting maritime rules. In the 2010s China built islands in South China Sea waters that officially belong to other countries. When an international tribunal ruled against China, Beijing ignored the judgment. For the past decade, China’s maritime militia has been harassing vessels from other countries.

Off the coast of the Philippines, Chinese vessels are bumping Philippine supply vessels and using water cannons against them. In the Taiwan Strait last year, China initiated a flotilla to inspect shipping—on both the Chinese and Taiwanese sides of the internationally recognized median line. Unidentified actors have blown up the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines and sabotaged two undersea cables and another pipeline in the Baltic Sea.

Over the past three years, Iran has attacked some two dozen merchant vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. And since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the so-called dark fleet of merchant vessels that have obscure owners and skirt maritime rules has grown to about 1,400 ships worldwide. If they cause accidents, other countries and vessels are on the hook. “The recent attacks on global sea routes are yet another assault on the taken-for-granted global commons which underpins international trade,” said George Robertson, a former secretary general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Western efforts to preserve the global maritime order aren’t succeeding. The U.S. Navy has conducted freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea, dispatched a force to the Strait of Hormuz, and assembled the ambitious Prosperity Guardian. Nothing seems to work.

If maritime activities can be attacked at any time or place, the global economy will stumble. “Houthi-style tech and tactics are creating uncertainty at a bargain price,” Adm. Manero said. The U.S.led strikes in Yemen are a show of force but haven’t halted the chaos. Days after the first strikes, the Houthis attacked a U.S.-owned cargo ship and an American destroyer.

It’s regrettable that so few countries have joined Prosperity Guardian or the smaller U.S.-led group in the Red Sea. Keeping the world’s oceans safe will continue to depend largely on the U.S. and U.K. Other nations can help by providing vessels, personnel, and intelligence. Think of it as the maritime equivalent of a neighborhood watch.”

————————————————————–

Jenny Li has contributed to The Epoch Times since 2010. She has reported on Chinese politics, economics, human rights issues, and U.S.-China relations. Ms. Li has extensively interviewed Chinese scholars, economists, lawyers, and rights activists in China and overseas. Cathy Yin-Garton is a contributor to The Epoch Times with a focus on China- related topics. They write:

“In a recent uptick in global tensions, Houthi armed forces have launched attacks on passing ships in the Red Sea, causing disruptions to global supply chains. Experts suggest that this may be another strategic move by Iran, following their alleged instigation of the Hamas attacks on Israel.

Simultaneously, there are claims that China seeks to divert U.S. attention from the Pacific by backing conflict in the Middle East, with evidence suggesting that the origin of the missiles used in the Red Sea attacks points to China.

A fifth round of U.S. strikes targeting Iran-backed Houthi armed forces in Yemen occurred on Jan. 24, the BBC reported. This marked the latest action against the Iran-backed Houthi armed forces, who are also fighting Yemen’s internationally backed government for local control.

The United States and its allies have launched a significant operation involving more than 100 precision-guided missiles that hit more than 60 targets across 28 Houthi-controlled locations. Targets included the Houthi armed forces’ assets, such as command and control nodes, ammunition depots, warehouses, launch systems, production facilities, and anti-aircraft radar systems.

The operation was in response to the Houthis’ repeated attacks on ships in the Red Sea since November 2023, posing threats to key trade and energy transport routes globally. President Joe Biden emphasized that the strikes, supported by U.S. allies, aim to address the “outrageous behavior” of the Houthis.

Carl Schuster, former director of operations at the Hawaii Joint Intelligence Center, believes the operation was significant and aims to diminish the Houthis’ ability to launch further strikes. However, he acknowledged that it may not prevent future attacks entirely. Mr. Schuster stated that the U.S. attacks inflicted significant losses on the Houthi armed forces, potentially damaging their ability to control territory in the Yemeni civil war.

As a result, the Houthi forces may consider ceasing their disturbances in the Red Sea. However, Mr. Schuster expressed concern that Iran might instigate the Houthi forces to continue harassing international ships transiting past Yemen. She notes that Iran’s motivation could be to exert pressure on Europe and the United States to influence Israel into ceasing its attacks on Hamas in Gaza.

The disturbance in the Red Sea poses a threat to major commercial shipping routes, impacting the flow of supplies and cargo between Asia and Europe, as well as U.S. ports. Mr. Schuster views this as Iran leveraging an “economic lever” against Europe and the United States. Additionally, she speculates that Iran plans various activities in the Red Sea to showcase its strength and power while signaling its interests.

On Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas launched a sudden attack on Israel, involving more than 3,000 rockets in the first four hours and 2,500 armed terrorists breaching Israel’s defenses. The attack resulted in the tragic loss of 1,200 civilian lives and marked the most severe violation of Israel’s borders since the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

Insider claims published in The Wall Street Journal described collaboration between Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officers and Hamas in planning the invasion, with meetings held in Beirut involving representatives of four Iranian-supported radical organizations. These organizations included Hamas in Gaza as well as Shiite radical groups and political factions in Lebanon, such as Hezbollah.

Fabian Hinz, a researcher at the London based International Institute for Strategic Studies, said in a post on social media platform X late last month that Houthi armed forces possess two formidable anti-ship ballistic missiles, namely “Asef” and “Tankil,” with potential modifications based on existing Iranian designs.

Shedding light on the origins of these missiles, internet news magazine Newsweek reported that Chinese military blogger “Krolliov” traced them back to China’s Red Flag 2A surface-to-air missiles, exported to Iran during the 1980s Iran–Iraq War, and the B610 and B611 missiles developed by China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp. Chinese military blogger Zhang Bin claimed on TikTok that the Houthi armed forces have become the “first organization to use Chinese missile technology to attack ships.”

As early as 2013, the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Farragut and the Yemeni coast guard discovered Chinese weapons on rebel ships in Yemen. The arsenal included C-4 explosives, electronic circuits, small caliber ammunition, laser rangefinders, artillery, and shells convertible into roadside bombs, the Popular Mechanics website reported.

U.S. and Yemeni officials also discovered 10 crates containing shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, the website reported. These boxes had Chinese templates, indicating that the missiles came from the state-owned China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corp. The images of these missiles show that they are “Vanguard 1-M” surface-to-air missiles aligned with the types used by the Chinese military.

Such alleged arms support from China extends beyond Yemen, with indications that its support extends to rebel forces in Syria. Photos released by a Syrian rebel group showcase members carrying Chinese FN- 6 missiles, another variant of shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles.

Mr. Schuster suggested that the CCP is strategically exploiting “opportunities that have arisen” to weaken the United States by supporting violent extremist groups such as Hamas in the Middle East. She claims that Beijing supports Hamas with funds, weapons, and ammunition, potentially expecting actions favorable to its interests.

Notably, after Hamas launched its deadly attack on Israel, the CCP refrained from condemning the terrorist acts. Instead, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi criticized Israel’s retaliatory actions, alleging they exceeded the scope of self-defense. Amid the turmoil in the Red Sea, the CCP is taking the same stance.

Mr. Schuster points out that the technology used by Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and rebel forces in Yemen, including drones and anti-ship ballistic missiles, have their roots in Chinese designs. “China sold drone designs to Iran many years ago and assisted them in developing their Iranian version,” he said. “In addition, the Houthi armed forces are using anti-ship ballistic missiles developed by Iran. They are using technology from China.”

He suggests that the CCP’s indirect support to those attacking U.S. interests in the Middle East diverts attention and resources away from Asia. The fact that many ships transiting the Red Sea display the flag of the People’s Republic of China to avoid attacks from the Houthis points to covert ties between the two.

Recent signals from five ships declared, “Everyone onboard is Chinese,” as they sailed the Red Sea further fueled suspicions. All five ships were safe from attack.

The United Nations Security Council has approved a resolution “strongly condemning” multiple attacks by the Houthi armed forces along the coast of Yemen, disrupting global trade. However, the CCP, along with Russia, Algeria, and Mozambique, abstained from voting”.

—————————————————–

The Wall Street Journal’s editorial board writes: “Here’s the contradiction of current U.S. Iran policy in a nutshell: While the Pentagon deploys a Thaad missile-defense system to the Middle East to protect U.S. bases from the volley of missiles fired by Iranian proxies, the Biden Administration has let the international embargo on Iran’s missile program lapse.

Oct. 18, 2023 was Transition Day under the Iran nuclear deal, and with it passed the U.N. missile and drone sanctions. Iran’s terrorist proxies and foreign clients such as Vladimir Putin send their regards.

A core problem with the 2015 nuclear talks negotiated by the Obama Administration was that key restrictions were deliberately allowed to sunset, at which point Iranian activities would be stamped legal. The arms embargo was allowed to expire in October 2020; missile and drone limits followed. The Obama [ideology] at the time was that the nuclear deal would cause Iran to moderate its malign behavior to fit the Western timetable, but that has never happened.

President Obama assured Americans that he could trigger so-called snapback sanctions in response to Iranian noncompliance. With the help of the U.K., France or Germany, the Biden Administration could have done that to avoid the sunset and reimpose sanctions. Over the summer these nations decided not to do so. The goal was to avoid an escalation that might disrupt U.S. diplomacy with Iran.

Instead, the U.S. and its allies have imposed their own missile sanctions—a poor substitute. Since European sanctions aren’t enforced extraterritorially, the entire global enforcement burden now falls on America. Yet U.S. export-control agencies are understaffed and the Biden Administration is declining to enforce oil sanctions. It isn’t credible.

The costs of a ineffective deterrent are real, even if Iran was never honoring the rules. Iran will now obtain equipment for its drone and missile programs more easily. Expect its missile production to expand and do more damage in the hands of Iran’s proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, as well as Russia in its war on Ukraine. New markets will also open up in Venezuela, Belarus and beyond.

It’s hardly a secret that Russia and Iran have been flouting the drone embargo. But the two states have thus far avoided trade in ballistic missiles. This latest demonstration of Western irresolution will encourage Iran to accelerate its missile testing and transfers, which could include supplementing the short-range ballistic missiles Russia has been using in Ukraine.

If the embargoes have long been halfhearted, the snapback mechanism was an intentional ruse. It was a token provision to help President Obama and the Europeans reassure their domestic audiences.

Nuclear, drone and missile violations stood no chance of triggering snapback, so long as the Obama and Biden Administrations could claim that talks were continuing and Iranian behavior might somehow change. The Biden policy has been to bribe Tehran, releasing frozen Iranian assets to buy peace and cooperation. See Israel for how that has worked.

What new catastrophe would cause President Biden to rethink his Iran policy? That’s the broader question given that every escalation by Tehran seems to earn Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei another reprieve. The forbearance— none dare call it appeasement— makes a larger war even more likely. The U. S. better send more missile defenses to the region.”

——————————————————–

Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. is a retired U.S. Marine general, served as commander of U.S. Central Command, 2019-22. He is executive director of the Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida and author of The Melting Point: High Command and War in the 21st Century.” He writes:

“Four years ago, at the direction of President Donald Trump, forces under my command struck and killed Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad. He was arriving there to coordinate attacks on our embassy and coalition targets across the region. Our successful strike threw Tehran’s plan into disarray.

The Iranian response— a barrage of missiles against Al Asad air base in western Iraq—was largely a punch that landed against air. The attack was designed to kill Americans, but commanders on the ground ensured there were no fatalities. I don’t minimize the injuries our forces absorbed in that attack, but it could have been much worse. The Iranians subsequently backed down.

Here is the lesson: The Iranians’ strategic decision-making is rational. Its leaders understand the threat of violence and its application. It takes will and capability to establish and maintain deterrence. We were able to reset deterrence as a result of this violent couplet. The Iranians have always feared our capabilities, but before January 2020, they doubted our will. The bombing of the memorial ceremony for Soleimani in Iran on Wednesday that killed dozens of civilians isn’t an example of deterrence but likely internal factions struggling for power.

After exchanging fire with the U.S. four years ago, Iran continued to pursue its long-term trifecta of strategic objectives: preserving the theocratic regime in Tehran, destroying Israel, and ejecting the U.S. from the Middle East. The mullahs’ actions, however, were muted and hidden behind proxies, from the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon to Hamas in Gaza and Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq and Syria. The Iranians remembered the result of a straightforward confrontation with the U.S.

Regrettably, the U.S. hasn’t remembered this lesson and the importance of matching demonstrable will with our capabilities. Even before Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack, Iranian forces were launching missile and drone strikes on our bases across the region, acting through proxies that gave them a measure of deniability. Our response has consistently been tentative, overly signaled and unfocused.

Iranian leaders work with Lenin’s dictum that “ you probe with bayonets: if you find mush, you push. If you find steel, you withdraw.” Tehran and its proxies are pressing their attacks because they haven’t confronted steel. The ability to stop such probing generally depends on a swift and violent counterattack. Delaying and equivocating usually means the response needed to re-establish deterrence has to be much larger than it would have been if it had been applied in a timely manner.

As a military officer, I have observed such hesitancy and lack of strategic clarity across several presidential administrations. In 2019, an early and sharp response to Iranian provocation might have ended the escalatory spiral well before the U.S. had to strike Solei-mani and accept the possibility of theater war.

There is another issue at stake. If avoiding escalation is the highest U.S. priority, then it is only logical to withdraw our forces from the region. That would ensure attacks on our bases don’t continue but ultimately endanger the future of the Mideast. Language that describes avoiding escalation as our highest priority is, therefore, inaccurate and dangerous. It sends an unhelpful signal to our adversaries as well as our friends and allies.

A case in point is Houthi activity in and around the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. In the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy of the U.S. we emphasize the importance of free passage through such global choke points. Protecting this principle, and our strategic priority, is more important than avoiding escalation. Taking strong action against the Houthis isn’t likely to lead to theaterwide escalation. Iran is waging a hidden-hand war from Yemen because it is cheap and because there are few consequences for Tehran.

A forceful response against the Houthis, designed to make them feel the pain of continuing their irresponsible behavior, wouldn’t ineluctably lead to a large-scale Iranian response. Pursuing this approach is especially consequential: The Chinese are watching to see how we respond to a threat involving a narrow strait.

Unfortunately, it is the U.S. that is being deterred, not Iran and its proxies. To reset deterrence, we must apply violence that Tehran understands. Paradoxically, if done earlier, this violence could have been of a far smaller and more measured scale. Indecision has placed us in this position. There is a way forward but it requires the U.S. to set aside the fear of escalation and act according to the priorities of our strategic documents and concepts. Iranians understand steel. They also understand mush. It is time to choose.”

—————————————————–

Walter Russell Mead is an American academic. He is the James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College and taught American foreign policy at Yale University. He was also the editor-at-large of The American Interest magazine. Mead is a columnist for The Wall Street Journal, a scholar at the Hudson Institute, and a book reviewer for Foreign Affairs magazine. He writes:

“As the Biden administration offered the mullahs in Tehran a $6 billion ransom for five American citizens, it was also offering Iran’s archrival Saudi Arabia unprecedented defense commitments and cooperation on a civilian nuclear program to help persuade Riyadh to normalize relations with Israel.

Inquiring minds want to know: Why is Joe Biden working so hard to do favors for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman? And why is he shoveling cash to the mullahs while working to empower their enemies?

These are good questions. Brokering a Saudi-Israeli peace deal will be expensive. It will cost in the region, where both Israel and Saudi Arabia will look to extract as many concessions and sweeteners as possible before giving Washington what it wants, and it will be expensive at home. The human-rights activists who dominate much of the Democratic Party’s foreign- policy apparatus will scream bloody murder if Mr. Biden embraces Bibi and MBS. Isolationists in both parties will ask why the Biden administration is deepening American security commitments in the Middle East instead of continuing to withdraw.

Two perceptions seem to be driving the new Biden approach.

  • First, while continuing diplomatic outreach to Iran demonstrates that Team Biden hasn’t given up on reaching some kind of understanding with Tehran, for now at least it is accepting that the mullahs don’t want to play ball.
  • Second, the administration appears to have a new appreciation of the importance of the Middle East, and therefore of leading powers like Saudi Arabia and Israel, for American global strategy.

Being the primary security and economic partner of the countries that dominate the world’s most important oil reserves still matters. America’s position in the Middle East gives us leverage over China’s energy supplies. It can ensure that the Middle East sovereign wealth funds prefer our tech and industrial sectors over those of our rivals. It can maintain the profitable defense relationships that help keep American arms makers ahead in a competitive arena.

This was all as true in January 2021 as it is today, but after 2½ years in office the administration now seems to get it. Team Biden now appears to understand that diplomatic relations and deepening formal security ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia could be the foundation of a new regional security architecture that secures criticalAmerican interests while reducing the long-term need for American military presence in the region. Getting the Saudis and the Israelis to “yes” will be difficult, but success would be transformational.

The biggest problem with the new approach is a familiar one: Iran. The mullahs will inevitably see a U.S.-backed regional security system aligning Israel and Saudi Arabia as a direct threat to their drive for regional hegemony. Iran has the capacity to cause a crisis in the Middle East any time it likes. It can accelerate the production of enriched uranium. It can attack shipping in the Gulf. It can order its proxies to launch missiles or stage terror attacks.

Team Biden seems to be hunting for a mix of carrots and sticks that will keep Iran quiet as the U.S. collaborates with the regime’s most bitter foes to build a powerful regional security architecture. Pallets of cash here, Marines on foreign-flagged tankers there. Can the U.S. pacify Iran while reassuring allies? We shall see.

There will be other problems, also familiar. Getting to yes will require the cooperation of two leaders who have little respect for Team Biden. Biden-era policy toward Saudi Arabia, pivoting awkwardly from icy contempt to oaths of undying affection, is a series of what my students would call “big yikes”—cringe-inducing rookie mistakes. And the chemistry between Mr. Netanyahu and the Democratic foreign- policy leaders of the Obama-Biden era has never been good.

Then there are the Palestinians. Although decades of Saudi and broader Arab frustration with Palestinian political incompetence have substantially reduced their influence in the region, the Palestinians haven’t fallen off the map. Saudi public opinion, and the government’s self-respect, will not permit Riyadh to reach agreements with Israel that set the Palestinians entirely off to one side.

With most of the Israeli cabinet dead-set against any concessions, and the Palestinian leadership at a low ebb of authority and legitimacy among its people, addressing this problem could be even more difficult than usual.

Nevertheless, the Biden administration’s embrace of the Trump-era vision of Middle East regional security based on Arab-Israeli reconciliation with American support has opened the door to new and perhaps more creative diplomacy in a region that is critical to the global balance of power and world peace. That is a very good thing.”

Leave a comment